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Introduction 
To take risk is to take part in some activity whereof the outcome is uncertain. Life itself is a 
risky endeavor and taking risk is an inevitable part of life. From an evolutionary standpoint, 
taking the right amount of risk is an essential behavior. Often, risky activities have more 
beneficial outcomes than safe activities. Back when hunting and gathering were the foremost 
methods of collecting food, the individuals that would hunt the largest animals would gain the 
esteem of the group. While hunting large animals is more risky than hunting smaller ones, it 
will also provide the group with more food. Individuals that are in good esteem of the group 
would also be more likely to attract the most and fittest partners, which increases their 
chances to successfully further their genes. 
 
Risk is never completely absent in any activity. Even something as simple and safe as 
stepping out of your bed poses some sort of risk in the form of getting caught in your 
bedsheets and tripping. Removing all risk from any activity is unrealistic. In that case, the 
proposed solution for reducing tripping by bedsheet accidents would be to forbid leaving the 
bed. People take the risk of getting out of bed because they believe themselves capable of 
coping with the situation and have feelings of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997). It should not be 
the goal of safety regulating entities to remove risk. The discussion should rather be about 
optimizing the amount of risk. Sadly, applying this reasoning in safety regulations is 
problematic at best from an ethical standpoint. It may prove hard to defend in court and public 
discussions why some activity should not be forbidden, while it is obviously risky. While 
more factors than discussed above are involved, a good example is discussions on the 
legalization of drugs. 
 
Humans optimize the risk they are willing to take through some internal weighing of costs and 
benefits. For example, when driving, the main goal is to get from one location to another. A 
secondary goal is to get there in good time. Traveling over a few kilometers, especially in a 
car, should take no longer than an hour at most. Almost anyone is willing to get into a car and 
drive at some speed. Getting there slowly is not as useful as getting there in good time. Wilde 
(1982a) proposed that the amount of risk anyone is willing to take depends on the utility of 
the behavior. This target level of risk (target risk) is determined by four utility factors. Target 
risk is higher when 1 and 4 are higher and 2 and 3 are lower. 
 
1) Expected benefits of risky behavior alternatives (getting there sooner). 
2) Expected costs of risky behavior alternatives (getting yourself injured in an accident). 
3) Expected benefits of safe behavior alternatives (getting there cheaper by avoiding fines). 
4) Expected costs of safe behavior alternatives (getting there later). 
 
This experiment concerns a theory that describes the above risk optimization process, which 
will be discussed below. The study experiment described is part of a series of experiments. 
Skill, as one of the many psychological factors affecting risk optimization, is investigated in 
this study experiment. A secondary, and related, objective is the investigation of a 
questionnaire that measures self-efficacy in video games, which was put together for this 
study. 
 
The theory of risk homeostasis 
People infer the riskiness of any situation or activity. This inference is often an imperfect 
judgement of the factual risk. A range of cognitive and perceptual factors may disturb the 
judgement quality of humans. For an introduction on this topic, read Kahneman and Tversky 
(2011). People compare the perceived risk of any situation or activity to their target risk and 
choose or adjust their behavior accordingly. In situations or activities that are safe, people are 
inclined to compensate by taking more risk. Risky behavior often has increased expected 
benefits. This is also true for the other way around. Drivers slow down when there is a bend in 
the road or when the road suddenly becomes narrower, even if it is factually unnecessary to 
do so (Adams, 1988). There is empirical evidence for risk compensation behavior in traffic 
accident data as well. Some changes in legislation or safety standards did not reduce the 
number of accidents because drivers were willing to take more risk (Wilde, 1982a). 
 
Wilde (1982a) conceptualizes the aforementioned behavior in a task analysis model of driver 
behavior. Drivers compare the perceived risk of the situation or activity with their internal 
target level of risk at a high frequency. This comparison leads to a change in behavior that 
compensates for factors and elements that reduce or increase risk on the short term. Wilde 
(1982a) proposed an explanation for this compensation, and states that it is a mechanism in a 
homeostatic process that works on the long term. The theory of Risk Homeostasis (RHT) is an 
explanation for empirical findings that although safety regulations in traffic are becoming 
stricter, the average accident rate over a few years does not decline. 
Just like a thermostat adjusting the heating of the water in a central heating system to a level 
that keeps the room temperature at the set level, the population adjusts its behavior so that the 
perceived level of risk matches the target level of risk. When the system increases the heat, it 
is responding to a loss of warmth in the room. This compensation is an adjustment that 
changes the temperature of the room in short term, but keeps the average temperature across a 
longer period constant, in order for the temperature to match the target. This is a homeostatic 
process because temporary deviations from the average will tend to return to the mean 
through a feedback loop. A thermometer measures the lower room temperature. The 
thermostat has a threshold value and signals the heater to turn on when the measured 
temperature is lower. 
 
Figure 1. A model of RHT, as proposed by Wilde (1982a). 
 
  
RHT controversy 
RHT has caused much discussion, of which Adams (1988) offers a good overview. The main 
problem with the theory is that none of the variables in the theory can be accurately measured 
in the real world. This is true for both authors discussing evidence in favor of RHT as well as 
authors discussing evidence that refutes RHT. Evans (1986), for example, makes the 
following claim. 
 
Based on the analysis presented it is concluded that the risk homeostasis theory should be 
rejected because there is: (1) no convincing evidence supporting it, and (2) much evidence 
refuting it. 
 
Evans (1986) discusses traffic accident data, but only presents data from fatal accidents, 
dismissing the fact that this disregards a huge amount of traffic accident data. Although the 
occurrence of fatal accidents shows a downward trend over time, this is a poor measurement 
of risk-taking behavior, and can hardly be presented as evidence that refutes RHT. 
 
Other empirical findings show that changes in legislation have short-term effects on traffic 
accident rates, but the average over the years does not change. Adams (1988) describes 
several different situations in which objectively safer environments lead to more accidents 
than subjectively dangerous environments. Firstly, fewer accidents take place in so-called 
adventure playgrounds compared to safer playgrounds where surfaces are smooth and 
rounded and equipment is surrounded by cushioning material (Hurtwood, 1968; as described 
in Adams, 1988). Secondly, the number of fatal accidents and the severity of accidents 
reduced when road conditions were worse through snow and ice. Thirdly, when Sweden 
changed to driving on the right side of the road, the number of road accident fatalities were 
reduced to 40% of the level before the change (Adams, 1985; as described in Adams, 1988).  
 
Despite claims of findings for or against RHT, Adams (1988) argues that RHT is not 
falsifiable for several reasons. Firstly, because RHT has circular reasoning in the light of 
evidence that might support it. To quote Adams (1988). 
 
We identify a person with a high target level of risk by his high level of accidents, and we 
explain his high level of accidents by his high target level of risk. 
 This is tied to the second point that, in the real world, risk cannot be measured directly. Risky 
behavior can only be measured by how many accidents have happened or by asking people to 
report on their own measures of risk-taking. Thirdly, it is impossible to predict the duration of 
the lagged feedback as depicted in the original model proposed by Wilde (1982a; Figure 1). 
This is a problem because there may be uncertainty whether enough time has passed before 
the feedback could have had its effects. Especially on the population scale, feedback could 
have its effects long after the change or event through a long chain of cause and effect 
relationships. The feedback could be so lagged that the homeostatic correction could take 
place several tens of years later (Adams, 1988). Fourthly, it is impossible to find all 
displacement effects. Displacement is the expression of risky behavior in another activity to 
compensate for reduced risk-taking in the original activity. Researchers would have to search 
the entire universe for displacement effects to state with confidence that a homeostatic process 
is not occurring. Displacement effects were measured when stricter laws on alcohol sale 
would increase problems from increased ecstasy consumption (Adams, 1988). 
 
RHT in experimental context 
Somewhat in line with Adams (1988), Wilde et al. (1985; as described in Jackson & 
Blackman, 1994) argued that correlational field data is no good to pinpoint any RHT effects. 
RHT has too many factors that cannot be measured and is not falsifiable in light of 
correlational data. An experimental setting, on the other hand, could prove to be a better 
method for confirming the theory. However, there are issues that arise in experimental 
contexts. One issue that might become more problematic is that of a time constraint of an 
experiment. Even in real life situations, the lagged feedback could lead to an unknown 
duration of the feedback loop. On this point, experimental conditions may hardly be any 
better to measure all feedback effects on the perceived risk of the situation. However, an 
experiment does offer the possibility to let participants have a timewise collapsed experience. 
Risky events such as accidents or near misses could be simulated in a shorter period than 
would occur in real life (Glendon, Hoyes, Haigney & Taylor, 1996). 
 
  
An experimental setting could prove to be a better method of investigation than real world 
data on several other counts. For one, it is much easier to measure and control other variables 
in an experiment. Secondly, experimental research makes it possible to find out the workings 
of various cognitive and behavioral factors in RHT. Wilde (1982a) proposed a model for 
driver behavior, which shows the working of and factors affecting risk compensation (Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2. A simplified model for explaining driver behavior (Wilde, 1982a). 
 
Experiments enable the identification of behavioral and situational pathways through which 
choices are made or how and under what conditions the target level and perceived level of 
risk are compared. There are some relevant psychological dimensions in RHT that can only be 
measured in an experimental setting (Glendon et al., 1996). Correlational data from the real 
world environment and anecdotal examples can hardly be used to draw any of the conclusions 
that are interesting for the confirmation of the theory. Even though RHT concerns the 
behavior of the population, in order to make meaningful predictions, it is important to 
understand what drives the behaviors of individuals. 
 
Skill and self-efficacy 
As one of the factors in driver behavior, skill is an important factor in a driver’s cognitive 
state (Figure 2). As discussed in the second paragraph, risk taking is inevitable to achieve 
anything. Atkinson (1964; as described in Sorrentin, Hewitt, & Raso-Knott, 1992) originally 
developed a theory of achievement motivation, which describes two types of individuals in 
relationship to risk-taking. Success-oriented individuals value success greater than failure 
while failure-threatened individuals value avoiding failure greater than achieving success. 
Sorrentin, Hewitt, and Raso-Knott (1992) investigate such informational and affective 
influences on risk-taking behavior in a game. The authors investigate two types of games in a 
series of studies. The first type is a skilled game, which relies on some ability of the player. 
The second type is a chance (or unskilled) game, which relies on chance and is nondiagnostic 
of ability. Most real-world activities that are of interest to this study are skilled activities, such 
as driving. A participant’s type of achievement motivation was found to be predictive of risk-
taking in a skilled game (Sorrentin, Hewitt, & Raso-Knott, 1992), while other research into 
the effects of achievement related motives in chance games have returned negative results. 
This suggests that achievement related motives, such as wanting to win in a game, are 
somehow related to whether one can use their skill in a game.  
 
In a series of experiments, Wilde (1988) found that skill and risk-taking were independent. 
Participants did incur real risk, either financially or in terms of social esteem. However, Wilde 
(1988) acknowledges that risk-taking might have different workings in other domains. In a 
study investigating the effects of experience, ability, and self-efficacy on risk-taking, the 
researchers found suggestions for self-efficacy to play a mediating role. Llewellyn and 
Sanchez (2008) investigated the effects of self-efficacy and the sensation seeking traits on 
risk-taking in risky sports, such as rock climbing. More experienced rock climbers had higher 
levels of self-efficacy, which motivated them to take more risk. Higher self-efficacy scores 
were positively associated with risk-taking in rock climbing (Llewellyn & Sanchez, 2008). 
Another study investigated risk taking among male high risk sports, finding that extreme risk 
takers had higher levels of self-efficacy than high risk takers (Slanger & Rudestam, 1997; as 
described in Llewellyn & Sanchez, 2008). 
 
  
Current study 
The experiment that is part of this study attempts to measure effects of RHT. The experiment 
is part of a series of investigations concerning RHT. The risk-taking of participants is 
measured in a simple videogame, specially created for the experiment. In this study, a newly 
developed measurement of self-efficacy in videogames is considered (Appendix A). This 
study aims to find an effect of self-efficacy on risk-taking behavior, and its role in RHT. As a 
validation method, the predictive value of scores on the questionnaires regarding performance 
in the videogame will be investigated. Trepte and Reinecke (2011) showed that performance 
and self-efficacy are related. In their study, self-efficacy in a game was shown to be a 
mediator between performance in the game and game enjoyment. The mediator, self-efficacy, 
can therefore be predicted by performance. However, the research method does not exclude 
that it is in fact the other way around. Self-efficacy scores could be constant, whether it is 
measured before or after playing the game. There is a well-understood problem with asking 
participants to rate their own self-efficacy before playing the game. It could lead to unwanted 
desirability effects on the performance in the game. While the score participants achieve in 
the game is a good measurement of performance, it cannot be used to find effects of skill on 
risk-taking behavior, because score is a product of time and speed, of which the latter is a 
measurement of risk-taking behavior. Speed and score, therefore, are not independent 
measurements. 
 
In summary, this study experiment measures risk-taking behavior in a video game. It is 
hypothesized that players are willing to take relatively more risk when their situation in the 
video game is safe compared to when it is dangerous (H1). The safety of the situation is 
determined by how many collisions the player could make before losing their ship at any 
point. To explore how risk-taking behavior might change or develop over time there are 
several conditions, which differ in respect to the amount of shields that players get at the start 
of a round. Self-efficacy in videogames is measured with a newly developed self-efficacy 
scale.  In line with the secondary objective, it is hypothesized that self-efficacy in videogames 
is a reliable scale and positively predicts performance in the game, measured by score (H2). 
Additionally, it is hypothesized that there is a positive effect of self-efficacy on risk-taking 
behavior (H3). Finally, it is hypothesized that the risk homeostasis effect is stronger for 
people with higher self-efficacy (H4). 
  
Method 
This experiment used the free version 8.1 of GameMaker (https://www.yoyogames.com) to 
develop the game for the experiment. This version is no longer available for download from 
the official site but is still available for download from large file hosting websites, such as 
Softonic (http://en.softonic.com/s/game-maker-8.1). The game was run on university 
workstation computers running Windows 7. The computers have 21” displays running at 
60Hz refresh rate and set to full HD resolution (1920x1080). The game has a resolution of 
800x600 pixels. It is displayed centered on the screen in a fullscreen black window. During 
execution, the game writes information to a log file containing the amount of shields players 
have left, the position of the ship, the speed of the ship, the location of the closest meteor, and 
the location of the first meteor in a direct path of the ship. This information could be used to 
calculate several measures of risk-taking behavior, such as the speed, how closely players 
dared to pass meteors, and how closely participants allowed meteors in path to get before 
dodging them. A list of several questions to assess self-efficacy in games (Appendix A) was 
developed, taking into account items discussed in the guide for constructing self-efficacy 
scales by Bandura (2006). The items on the short questionnaire were entered into a Qualtrics 
(http://www.qualtrics.com/) questionnaire. This questionnaire was displayed and could be 
answered on the computer by opening the questionnaire link in a Chrome (Google) web-
browser window. 
 
Participants (N=181) were randomly selected students at the social science faculty and 
acquaintances of the researchers. There were no exclusion criteria for participation. When 
participants agreed on participation, they could make an appointment with the research team. 
Participants were reminded of participation one day before the experiment through email. The 
experiment took place in a computer classroom in the faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden 
University. The classroom had over 20 workstation computers. Up to ten participants could 
enter a session, effectively allowing one empty computer between every participant to reduce 
social desirability effects from being able to see each other’s screens. When entering the 
classroom all participants were welcomed and asked to sign a consent form. Instructions for 
the experiment and the game are given in a presentation by the research staff. Participants 
were asked to be quiet and focus on their own screen. Participants received the following 
instructions for the game. 
 
The game is about a little spaceship in a galaxy not so far away underway to deliver very 
valuable cargo. If you reach your destination sooner you will get more points. Unfortunately, 
the ship runs into a thick cloud of meteors. You are the ship’s captain and you have to stay on 
your toes to dodge the danger and get through. 
 
Control instructions were presented in the first screen of the game. When clicking continue, 
participants would get to play a practice round. Following the practice round, participants 
would play through five different rounds in a random order. In the game, players navigate a 
spaceship (90 by 40 pixels) through a thicket of oncoming meteors (each 60 by 60 pixels). 
The game is a flat two dimensional area where players can control the speed at which meteors 
fly toward the ship and the vertical position of the ship on screen. The horizontal position of 
the ship was fixed at 109 pixels from the left side of the screen. A collision with a meteor 
triggers an animation of an activating shield to protect the ship and removes one shield from 
the set of shields players receive at the start of a round. When players have lost their shields, 
another collision triggers an animation of their ship exploding. At every end of a round 
participants were prompted to click continue to start the next round. A round was completed 
by losing all shields and destroying the ship or by making it to the end by staying alive for 
four minutes. At the end of the five rounds, the game closed and the computer switched focus 
to the questionnaire. Participants were free to collect their reward for participation and leave 
when they were done with the questionnaire. 
 
The experiment has a double-blind randomized design with five within-subject conditions. 
The within-subject conditions were different in respect to the amount of shields participants 
had during the game. Participants had zero, one, three, or five shields, with three shields in 
two conditions. In one of these two conditions, the actual number of shields is unknown to the 
participant. These five within-subject conditions translate to seventeen shield situations. 
Measurements of risk-taking behavior are recorded and averaged over every shield situation, 
resulting in seventeen within-subject variables per risk-taking measurement variable. For 
example, the one-shield condition has two shield situations, namely one shield and zero 
shields left. 
  
Results 
181 participants participated in the study. For seven participants something went wrong with 
the game. A participant that was always flying at the slowest speed was excluded. This means 
that he or she did not once attempt to fly faster, while the slowest speed is very slow. The goal 
of the experiment was for participants to match the perceived risk in the game to their internal 
target level of risk. When participants did not even try a different speed even once, it was 
assume that they did not understand the instructions. The data concerning the amount of 
playing time in which participants played the game for each shield there was some noticeable 
gameplay behavior that warrants additional exclusion from the dataset. Some participants 
played to finish the game as soon as they could by purposefully flying their ship into meteors. 
Finally, one participant skipped many items in the questionnaire by filling in nonsense values.  
 
This leaves 168 participants for final analysis, with 47 being male (28.0%) and 121 female 
(72.0%). Age of participants was hardly normally distributed with a large peak around the 
mean (M = 22.3, SD = 4.0, Kurtosis = 34.6, Skewness = 4.5) and two outliers in the high end 
(ages 40 and 57, while all other ages are 30 and lower). Scores in the game were slightly 
skewed, having a tail towards the higher scores (M = 1938, SD = 1177, Kurtosis = 1.8, 
Skewness = 1.4). Measurements of risk-taking behavior are the mean speed at which 
participants dared to pace their ship and the mean time to collision (ttc) participants had to 
incoming meteors. Lower values of ttc mean that participants moved their ship out of the way 
of incoming meteors later and this with less margin for error. It should be noted that ttc is a 
function of speed and distance, thusly related to speed. 
 
  
Initial exploration of the data shows a problem.  The averages of the first shield that 
participants lose are heavily influenced by the first few seconds of the start of a game session. 
At the start, the spaceship flies at the lowest speed and with no meteors nearby by default. The 
spaceship does not change speed when it is hit by a meteor. This causes the averages of the 
first shields to be severely biased (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). This problem is in fact a major 
point of discussion from other reports concerning this study. In order to avoid this, the 
statistics from every first shield that participants played and lost were removed from analysis. 
This means that the zero-shields condition is dropped from analysis. The four situations in the 
five-shields condition, two situations in the three and unknown-shields conditions, and one 
situation in the one-shield condition remain. This leaves twelve repeated measurements for 
each mean speed and mean ttc. 
 
 
Figure 3. Plot of mean speed per shield situation (line diagram). 320px/s is the minimum 
speed. Note that one can count the seventeen shield situations in this diagram. 
 
 Figure 4. Plot of mean ttc per shield situation (line diagram). 
 
The analysis of the data to pinpoint a homeostatic effect was done on two levels. Firstly, risk-
taking behavior averages of shield situations within each condition are compared to each 
other. Changes in risk-taking behavior are proof of participants adapting to a changing safety 
situation. Secondly, condition averages are compared to each other. 
 
None of the speed measurements were normally distributed according to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests (at p = 0.05 significance level). However, skewness and 
kurtosis levels were within acceptable values, with 1.06 being the largest difference from 
zero. Four out of twelve measurements of ttc were normally distributed according to above 
tests. Skewness and kurtosis values were well within acceptable values, with 0.73 being the 
largest difference from zero. Because skewness and kurtosis are not too bad and the F-test is 
robust against normality with large sample sizes, it is viable to continue further analysis. 
 
  
The amount of shields that participants had left in a session did not affect their speed nor ttc in 
the three and five-shields conditions (Table 1). However, when the amount of shields was 
unknown to the participants, speed and ttc were significantly affected by the amount of 
shields participants had actually lost. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc pairwise comparisons of 
the three shield situations in the unknown amount of shields condition were performed. It was 
found that only the average speed increase from  the final shield to having no shields left did 
not increase significantly (MD = 9.80, p = .18). Ttc only decreased significantly from having 
two shields and no shields (MD = -0.07, p < .05). 
 
Table 1 
Within-subjects effects of shield situation or condition on measurements of risk-taking 
behavior. 
Measurement: average speed 
 Sphericity+ Within-Subjects Effects 
Condition Test statistic  df Epsilon Test 
statistic  
df1 df2 Sign. Effect 
size  
 W X2   (F)   (p) (η2) 
3 Shields .77 37.16* 2 .82b 1.27 1.65 240.48 .28 .01 
5 Shields .16 232.77* 9 .50a 0.88 1.99 257.27 .42 .01 
Unknown .64 61.45* 2 .74a 14.36 1.47 202.94 < 
.001 
.09 
Between .94 10.33 5  3.69 3 474 < .05 .02 
 
Measurement: average ttc 
 Sphericity+ Within-Subjects Effects 
Condition Test statistic  df Epsilon Test 
statistic  
df1 df2 Sign. Effect 
size  
 W X2   (F)   (p) (η2) 
3 Shields .89 17.21* 2 .91b 0.33 1.82 265.68 .70 < .01 
5 Shields .64 57.85* 9 .84b 1.31 3.35 432.71 .27 .01 
Unknown .99 1.08 2  4.33 2 276 < .05 .03 
Between .87 22.50* 5 .93b 3.61 2.79 441.42 < .05 .02 
Note. + Sphericity is examined for the adjustment of the degrees of freedom. * Significant at 
the p < .001 level. a Greenhouse-Geisser correction. b Huynh-Feldt correction. 
 
  
The kurtosis and skewness values for condition averages of speed and ttc measurements are 
within acceptable values, respectively differing from zero by 0.76 and 0.69 at most. Only the 
ttc measurement in the one-shield condition was not significantly different from a normal 
distribution, according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. For the same reasons 
as stated above, however, it is viable to continue analysis. There was a significant difference 
between conditions on both risk-taking behavior measurements (Table 1). However, 
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc pairwise comparisons show that only the one and five-shields 
conditions differed significantly from each other. In the one-shield condition, participants had 
lower speed (MD = 32, p < .05) and higher ttc (MD = 0.70, p < .05). 
 
Self-efficacy 
A scale of self-efficacy in games was developed for this study. The scale measures ones self-
efficacy pertaining to how quickly one would be able to understand the mechanics, controls, 
and objectives and whether they would perform well, be able to complete the game at the 
highest difficulty level, and perform above average. Reliability analysis showed an excellent 
scale for self-efficacy with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93. The squared multiple pairwise 
correlation between each item was larger than 0.61. The items were summed into a self-
efficacy score, which was entered into regression analysis as a predictor of score. There was a 
significant linear relationship between self-efficacy and score (R2 = 0.19, p < .001). Skewness 
(-0.41) and kurtosis (-0.25) values were acceptable, and according to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S = 0.06, p > .20) test the distribution of self-efficacy was normal, albeit not so 
according to the Shapiro-Wilk (S-W = 0.98, p < .01) test. Visual examination of a predicted 
versus residual scatterplot showed slight heteroscedasticity (Figure 5). The regression model 
with self-efficacy in games as a predictor of score was found to be significant (F(1, 165) 
39.07, p < .001). Both the constant (B = 599.81, t(166) = 2.60, p < .05) and the self-efficacy 
scale (B = 25.43, t(166) = 6.25, p < .001) coefficients were significant predictors of score. 
 
 Figure 5. Plot of predicted values versus residual values of score by the regression model with 
self-efficacy as a predictor (scatterplot). 
 
To find the effect of self-efficacy on risk-taking behavior in the game, the self-efficacy score 
was added to the above analysis as a covariate. Self-efficacy score had significant positive 
correlations with speed (.30 < r < .44) and significant negative correlations with ttc (-.38 < r < 
-.16) measurements. The between-subjects effects of self-efficacy as a covariate of the within-
subject effects of condition or shield situation on risk-taking behavior are all significant 
(Table 2). 
  
Table 2 
Between-subjects effects of self-efficacy on measurements of risk-taking behavior in each 
shield situation or condition. 
Measurement: average speed. 
Condition Test statistic  df1 df2 Sig. Effect size  
 (F)   (p) (η2) 
3 Shields 23.58      1      144  < .001           .14 
5 Shields 30.21      1      128  < .001           .19 
Unknown 29.97      1      136  < .001           .18 
Between 31.83      1      156  < .001           .17 
 
Measurement: average ttc. 
Condition Test statistic  df1 df2 Sig. Effect size  
 (F)   (p) (η2) 
3 Shields 24.02      1      144     < .001           .14 
5 Shields 23.17      1      128     < .001           .15 
Unknown 23.13      1      136     < .001           .15 
Between 24.23      1      156     < .001           .13 
 
 
With self-efficacy in games as a covariate, both speed and ttc changed significantly as shields 
were lost in the five-shields condition. In the unknown amount of shields condition, the main 
effect of speed was lost by adding self-efficacy as a covariate, but the effect on ttc was 
significant (Table 3). There is no interaction effect of self-efficacy and condition on risk-
taking behavior. 
  
Table 3 
Within-subjects interaction effects of self-efficacy and shield situation or self-efficacy and 
condition on risk-taking behavior measurements. 
Measurement: average speed 
 Sphericity+ Within-Subjects Effects 
Condition Test statistic  df Epsilon Test 
statistic  
df1 df2 Sig. Effect 
size  
 W X2   (F)   (p) (η2) 
3 Shields .78 35.95* 2 .83b 1.09 1.66 239.62 .33 .01 
5 Shields .18 216.51* 9 .52a 6.28 2.06 263.80 < .01 .05 
Unknown .64 60.67* 2 .73a 0.95 1.47 199.71 .37 .01 
Between .94 9.45 5  0.06 3 468 .98 < .01 
 
Measurement: average ttc 
 Sphericity+ Within-Subjects Effects 
Condition Test statistic  df Epsilon Test 
statistic  
df1 df2 Sig. Effect 
size  
 W X2   (F)   (p) (η2) 
3 Shields .89 16.47* 2 .92b 1.19 1.84 264.67 .30 .01 
5 Shields .66 53.27* 9 .86b 3.85 3.44 440.23 < .01 .03 
Unknown .99 0.98 2  4.20 2 272 < .05 .03 
Between .86 23.22* 5 .94b 0.26 2.81 437.72 .84 < .01 
Note. + Sphericity is examined for the adjustment of the degrees of freedom in the case of 
absence of sphericity. * Significant at the p < .001 level. a Greenhouse-Geisser. b Huynh-
Feldt. 
 
  
By recoding self-efficacy to make two groups, the effects of self-efficacy as a covariate can 
be visualized (Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8). Values are recoded so that all self-efficacy 
scores below 50 are in group 1 and those above 50 in group 2. The two groups are nearly 
equal, with 72 of 168 participants (43%) in group 1. 
 
 
Figure 6. Estimated marginal means of speed (left) and ttc (right) in the three-shields 
condition, split by self-efficacy group. Values of “shieldspent” are related to shield situation, 
with 1 being two shields left, 2 being one shield left, and 3 being zero shields left (line 
diagram). 320px/s is the minimum speed. 
 
 
Figure 7. Estimated marginal means of speed (left) and ttc (right) in the five-shields condition, 
split by self-efficacy group (line diagram). 320px/s is the minimum speed. 
 
 Figure 8. Estimated marginal means of speed (left) and ttc (right) of the unknown-shields 
condition, split by self-efficacy group (line diagram). 320px/s is the minimum speed. 
 
To visualize the origin of the effects, boxplots of average speed in the five-shields and three-
shields condition were created. The boxplots were split by self-efficacy group (Figure 9). In 
the three-shields condition, the two self-efficacy groups do not have enough differences 
across shield situations for statistical significance. In the five-shields condition, however, high 
self-efficacy players fly faster in the beginning and lower their speed to a level that is similar 
to that of low self-efficacy players. 
 
 
Figure 9. Visualization of the distribution of the data of average speed in every shield 
situation of the five-shields (left) and three-shields (right) conditions, split by self-efficacy 
group (boxplot). 320px/s is the minimum speed. 
Discussion 
There were three analyses in the scope of this study. The effects of shield situation, within 
each condition, or condition on risk-taking behavior were examined in the first analysis. In the 
second analysis, the reliability of a new self-efficacy scale and its relationship to performance 
in the game was examined. Finally, the first analysis was repeated, with self-efficacy added as 
a covariate. This analysis could find whether there is an interaction of self-efficacy with the 
effect of the amount of shields left on risk-taking behavior. The results are summarized 
shortly before they are discussed in further detail. 
 
This study has made several findings. Firstly, there is no direct evidence of risk compensation 
as players of a game lose their shields and come closer to losing their ship (H1). Secondly, a 
newly developed self-efficacy scale has good internal reliability, and can significantly predict 
performance in the game in this sample (H2). Thirdly, self-efficacy had a significant effect on 
risk-taking behavior (H3). Fourthly, self-efficacy scores were found to interact with the effect 
of the amount of shields players had left on risk-taking behavior, but only in specific 
situations (H4). The specificity of these situations suggests that self-efficacy is probably a 
factor in the perception of risk. In light of these results, the hypotheses that were stated in this 
experiment cannot be accepted. 
 
Risk-taking behavior 
Firstly, there was no proof of participants adapting their risk-taking behavior according to 
differing safety situations (H1). Only in the unknown-shields condition, the shield situation 
affected risk-taking behavior. Participants kept increasing, instead of reducing, their risk-
taking behavior by increasing speed and reducing their ttc. In the other conditions, however, 
risk-taking behavior remained constant. While we would have expected the risk taking 
behavior to go down as players lose shields, some underlying variables in Wilde’s (1982a) 
original model (Figure 2) might be counteracting this, causing the risk-taking behavior to stay 
at the same level. There is some grounds to discuss that some form of risk compensation is 
taking place. In its absence, risk taking would have been increasing in every condition. Herein 
is assumed that risk compensation does not happen or happens to a lesser extent in the 
unknown shields condition. This is to say that risk taking is some product of underlying 
variables that increase or decrease risk taking. In the case of this experiment the net result of 
this product is a constant level of risk taking.  
Another explanation for the absence of reduced speed is that instead of gaining points by 
staying alive longer participants may have wanted to keep an increased speed to maximize the 
amount of points they could get in their last life. Otherwise, the perceptual difference between 
having two shields or zero shields left may be too small for any participant to judge the 
situation as being more dangerous. In addition, participants might judge that flying faster is 
not more dangerous as they were getting used to the speed. In conclusion, the risk-taking 
behavior is matched to the target level of risk relatively quickly and the perceived risk 
somehow remains constant even though participants lose shields. 
 
Secondly, condition had a significant effect on risk-taking behavior. In pairwise comparison, 
however, only the one-shield condition differed from the five-shields condition. In the one-
shield condition participants played less risky by flying their ship slower and dodging 
incoming meteors sooner. The three-shields and unknown-shields conditions were somewhere 
in between the one-shield and five-shields conditions, albeit not significantly different from 
either. This finding does suggest that participants actually played more carefully in a risky 
situation than in a safe situation, and thus at least compensate for added or reduced risk. 
 
Self-efficacy and risk-taking behavior 
The self-efficacy scale had excellent internal reliability as a scale in this sample and was a 
significant predictor of score in the game (H2). Validation by comparing this scale to other 
scales that measure the same or similar constructs is warranted for future use. Further analysis 
should consider whether six items are appropriate and which aspects of self-efficacy in games 
are not covered. 
 
  
There was a between-subjects effect of self-efficacy on speed and ttc in all shield situations 
and conditions (H3). Risk-taking behavior was higher for participants that had higher self-
efficacy. Additionally, self-efficacy did interact with shield situation on risk-taking behavior 
between shield situations within the five-shields condition, and ttc only in the unknown-
shields condition. Higher self-efficacy scores of participants led to more risk-taking behavior 
per shield lost than lower self-efficacy scores. The absence of this finding in the three-shields 
condition is puzzling at least. Confident players perhaps judged that having three shields is 
not as safe as having five shields. These players will only increase their risk-taking behavior 
compared to unconfident players if the situation is judged as safe. The effect of self-efficacy 
on risk-taking behavior seems to diminish as the shield situation becomes more dangerous. 
This notion is confirmatory of the hypothesis that, in fact, self-efficacy does play a role in the 
perception of risk in the process of risk compensation. 
 
Between conditions, however, there was no interaction with self-efficacy. Players with higher 
self-efficacy scores took more risk than players with lower self-efficacy scores in every 
condition. However, this increased risk-taking was equal across all conditions, hence the 
absence of an interaction effect. While this finding speaks against the hypothesis (H4), it does 
not refute that self-efficacy plays a role in risk perception. Averaging risk-taking behavior 
within conditions may be a bad way to examine risk compensation because it summarizes 
much meaningful data. 
 
  
Limitations 
Proving risk homeostasis theory is a bridge too far for this research design. The game might 
not give enough feedback on the risk-taking behavior of the participant. In the real world, 
many social elements give feedback on behavior. Getting a dent in your car is not only 
reducing the aesthetics of the car, but you will have to explain to friends and family what 
behavior had led to it. If players could compare their score to other players there would be 
more and better feedback. Then, players might more thoroughly judge their expected benefits 
and losses from risky or safe behavior, which is an important part of risk homeostasis theory 
as discussed in the introduction. Additionally, there might not be enough time for players to 
learn the costs and benefits of their behavior in the game. The effects of more in-depth 
training sessions should be examined. Improving feedback might also help to increase the 
effect sizes. The resulting effect sizes from the analyses in the current study are quite small. 
Another way that might help to increase effect sizes is dramatizing the effect of hitting a 
meteor and putting more emphasis on the amount of shields that players had. 
 
The exclusion of the first shield that participants lost in every condition is unfortunate, but no 
deal-breaker. One could argue that players will always treat their first shield with extra care, 
thusly explaining the lower speed. This would have been an interesting finding, albeit very 
unlikely. To avoid this from happening in future research there are two solutions. Either the 
first few seconds of data collection should be excluded from analysis or the speed should be 
set randomly at the start. While the first offers a challenge pertaining to choosing a point in 
time to cut off data, the second may introduce unnecessary noise in the data. A third option is 
to set the speed of the ship to the overall average that has been found in this and previous 
studies, allowing participants to slow down or speed up as they please. 
 
  
This study contained some other source of bias in measurement. Participants that played more 
risky actually lost all their shields, while participants that played less risky made it to the end 
without losing their ship. Participants that made it to the end by flying for four minutes have 
missing data for the shields they did not lose. Therefore, the average risk-taking behavior is 
lower when there are more shields and higher when there are less, relative to what would have 
been found if there had been no missing data. Players that made it to the end and thus had 
missing data for some of the shields they did not lose should be excluded or compared to 
players that lost their ship. This way we can know whether there was actually a bias in the 
measurement. However, removing these cases from analysis actually means removing all 
cases with a safe playstyle, introducing a range of other limitations. Alternatively, the game 
could be gradually increased in difficulty over time until impossible to complete, or there 
should be certain points where players definitely lose a shield, so that even safe players have 
no missing data. Fair warning should be issued for frustrated participants due to making them 
play an unbeatable game. 
 
As shortly discussed above, participants might be taking increasing amounts of risk because 
they are starting to feel familiar with the game, counteracting the effects of finding themselves 
in a more dangerous situation. The training round might have been too short to familiarize 
participants with the game. An argument that alleviates the impact of this flaw is that the 
novelty of a situation is actually inherent to risk perception. Nonetheless, it may prove 
interesting to further study these effects in detail to increase effect-size. In reality, nearly all 
car drivers have had sufficient experience and training. The unfamiliarity that players had 
with the game could be controlled for by comparing risk-taking behavior at the first few 
minutes to a later point in time. The effect of differing lengths of practice sessions or the 
introduction of in-depth training sessions should be examined. 
 
Another source of bias in measurement concerns the calculation of ttc. The data did not 
exclude ttc data where the meteor was hit, causing noise in the data so that averages are lower 
than they should be. The ttc should have only been logged for meteors that were actually 
dodged. 
 
  
Finally, self-efficacy was measured after participants played the game. Therefore, a 
judgement of their own performance in the game could be a large latent factor in the 
explained variance of the self-efficacy score. However, there are several arguments for 
choosing to present the questionnaire after the game. Firstly, the questions were carefully 
chosen so they have very general meaning, using wording such as “in a game”. Secondly, 
there was no way for participants to have an objective view of their final score, nor compare 
their performance to others. Lastly, the priming effects of asking people about their skills 
before they play the game could have worse effects than. Optimally, the scale is tested by 
presenting it before or after a game and examining the differences in the relationships 
between performance and self-efficacy.  
 
Future research 
The unknown shield condition is possibly the best reflection of reality. There is hardly a 
factual and quantifiable representation of the risk of a situation in reality. Hitting a meteor in 
the unknown-shields condition will instill the feeling that the situation has probably become 
more dangerous. The comparison of behavior in this condition to that in which the amount of 
shields is known led to some interesting results, as discussed above.  
 
The scale for self-efficacy in games was reliable in this sample and had a significant moderate 
predictive value on performance in the game. While further testing of the scale in other 
samples and validation through correlation with related constructs is warranted, initial results 
are promising. 
 
A complicated theory with so many factors warrants more research. Some suggestions for 
future research were described in the discussion of the results above. However, most of these 
are related to technical limitations or constraints of this specific game and research design. 
Other, more general, elements that warrant further research are for example the effects of 
experience. Perhaps, longer training sessions leads to different risk-taking behavior. Then, the 
difficulty of the task may play a large role. It is not inconceivable that there is an interaction 
effect between skill and task difficulty on risk-taking behavior. Another major factor that has 
not been investigated thus far is motivation and effort.  
 
Naturally, many other factors are related to risk-taking behavior, which could be studied in 
detail. However, the main goal of such research is to prove risk homeostasis theory in all 
humans. The main goal is not trying to find its occurrence in very specific situations. Sadly, 
the results to prove the existence of a risk homeostasis process is sparse in this study. Future 
research should foremost focus on increasing the power of the tests that have been used, as 
opposed to finding more specific circumstances in which homeostatic processes may emerge. 
 
To conclude, this study has not been able to show a risk homeostatic process. Only a strong 
decline in risk-taking behavior as players lost shields would justify the conclusion that risk 
homeostatic processes were in effect. Some findings suggest risk compensation in certain 
situations. An interaction effect with self-efficacy was found. The self-efficacy scale 
developed for this study was shown to have good internal reliability and predictive quality of 
score and risk-taking behavior. 
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Appendix A 
Self-efficacy in videogames (SE videogames). 
 
I can perform well in a game 
0 (cannot do at all) – 50 (moderately can do) – 100 (highly certain can do) 
 
I can understand and use controls effectively for a game quickly 
0 (cannot do at all) – 50 (moderately can do) – 100 (highly certain can do) 
 
I can understand the mechanics of a game quickly 
0 (cannot do at all) – 50 (moderately can do) – 100 (highly certain can do) 
 
I can complete the hardest difficulty setting of a game 
0 (cannot do at all) – 50 (moderately can do) – 100 (highly certain can do) 
 
I can perform above average when playing against other players 
0 (cannot do at all) – 50 (moderately can do) – 100 (highly certain can do) 
 
I can quickly understand the objective in a game 
0 (cannot do at all) – 50 (moderately can do) – 100 (highly certain can do) 
